




Institutional Reform and the Judiciary  






This paper presents some general lessons in institution building that has relevance for 
reform of the judiciary. The paper emphasizes the value of simplicity in design 
commensurate with country capacity, the importance of innovation/experimentation, and 
of economic openness in effective institution building. It underscores how the incentives 
of individuals depend on both the details of institutional design within the judiciary itself 
but also some critical institutions external to the judiciary. Finally the paper argues for 
the need to ground reform initiatives on a solid empirical and comparative approach. It 
illustrates some of these issues by drawing on a recent project conducted by the World 
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All societies need institutions to settle disputes and mechanisms to enforce 
property rights and contracts. Without these mechanisms commercial transactions are 
limited to the simplistic and high risk constrains many productive investments. The 
systems that nations develop to fill these needs take myriad forms ranging from family- 
and community-based norms and networks to formal state-sponsored judicial systems 
enforcing complex laws. In each country, the relative importance of state-sponsored 
formal enforcement mechanisms versus informal methods depends on the nature of the 
transaction being disputed, the nature of the parties involved in the dispute, the particular 
conditions of each country (such as income level, literacy, and technology), and how well 
(swiftly, cheaply and fairly) each of these mechanisms provide or are perceived to 
provide what the disputing parties demand.  
Well functioning, state-sponsored justice provides a complement to other, more 
informal, systems. Together these systems, when they work well, keep the costs of 
enforcement low for both small and large participants in markets and for small and large 
transactions. But in many countries formal, state-sponsored courts and the laws and 
regulations that they attempt to propagate and enforce bear no relation to private informal 
systems. That is, the two systems are viewed as complete substitutes for justice and 
contract enforcement because formal judiciaries are not relevant or are not perceived to 
be relevant for many citizens. For example , while large agricultural corporations and 
wealthy landowners may use formal courts to resolve disputes, small family firms and 
farm labourers not only may not use the courts but may consider the rules that courts are 
enforcing alien to their way of life.   3
Governments in many countries around the world are designing reforms in their 
judicial systems or thinking about how to build consensus or coalitions for reforms. Some 
interesting policy questions arise –why is the legal and judicial system not relevant for 
some citizens and in some countries? When and how should one strengthen the roles that 
judicial systems play in economic development? What does the study of institutional 
reform in general, and judicial system reform in particular, teach us about the design of 
systems in various countries?
2  To answer these questions, it is necessary to think not 
only about the final goal but, the capacity of countries to implement certain reforms and 
the possible need for a graduated approach. 
This paper presents some general conclusions regarding institutional development 
(see World Bank, 2001), which are also relevant for the judiciary and some of the 
evidence which indicates how critical a role the formal legal system can play to support 
the development of private business.
3 It discusses why it is important for governments 
and citizens to take an active and practical approach to judicial system development, and 
the value of a comparative and cross-country, empirical approach for reformers, 
illustrating this point by drawing upon a recent project undertaken by the World Bank 
and others.
 4 
One of the main conclusions that has emerged from the study of institutional 
design and institutional change is that despite the prevalence of international norms and 
the popular notion of “best” practice, a great part of effective institution building relies on 
                                                 
2 Recent thinking underscores how looking across different types of institutions rather than confining 
oneself to the study of one particular institution yields useful lessons. 
3 Institutions are the informal and formal rules that guide behaviour. Sometimes “institutions” is also used 
to refer to organisations and organisational structure. 
4 Parts of this paper are based on the WDR 2002, and on a project conducted jointly by Harvard University, 
Lex Mundi and the World Bank.  This project is described in Djankov et al, 2003.   4
the capacity of those establishing and using these institutions.  New institutions need to 
complement existing conditions in a country—that is, it needs to be consistent with the 
country’s income level, skills and education levels, available technology, the distribution 
of income, geography, and other institutions (e.g. court performance depends on how the 
laws are written in the country, how lawyers associations work, the presence of 
alternative dispute resolution systems etc.). While this “lesson” may seem obvious, it is 
sometimes hard to reconcile with the concept of international “best” practice. This is not 
to say that nothing can be learned from looking at international or foreign norms and 
practices.  To the contrary, as is argued later. 
A key question is how do we adapt institutions which are effective in high income 
countries for the needs of low income countries? Courts are only relevant to the extent 
that they approach dispute resolution in a manner that is understood by the people they 
serve and that meet their needs .  One answer might be “ simplicity” in design. 
Second, both state and private entities can benefit by being allowed to experiment 
/innovate in terms of finding the institutional design that “fits”. Study of different 
systems, however distinct in history and origin, is important because it gives us ideas and 
enhances the realm of the possible: moreover, some of these ideas may bear fruit.  
Third, some degree of competition provides incentives for improving institutional 
design. The desire to do better than a peer group is often a healthy driver of change in 
private business—so can it be in the public domain for both individuals and 
organizations. 
5 Fourth, economic openness, for example trade in goods, and services, 
information sharing across and within countries, can go a long way in facilitating 
institutional reform by creating demand for change.  
                                                 
5 World Bank, 2001.   5
Finally, embedded in the above, is the notion that how institutions function 
depends very much on the incentives provided to the relevant agents. People’s incentives 
depend on the whole institutional system; to understand how various institutional features 
work together, it is necessary to understand the details of each institution.   
This paper starts with a general introduction which reviews some of the existing 
empirical evidence on the importance of formal courts to economic development. The 
second part of the introduction discusses some examples of the process of change 
drawing on the limited literature on this subject.
6 The second section is devoted to a 
discussion of the various institutional features that must be considered when designing 
court reform. A final section of the paper is devoted to one particular type of institution - 
procedural law.  It draws on a recent project conducted jointly by Harvard University, 
Lex Mundi and the World Bank, that looks at examples of procedural law in countries 
around the world. The purpose of the discussion is to illustrate , in light of what recent 
studies have shown, and the lessons mentioned above, how countries may think about 
judicial reform going forward.  
The paper also highlights systematic differences among different regions of the 
world. This type of regional classification may be a purely spurious one—that is one 
might argue that contiguity does not necessarily imply similarity of either outlook, 
culture, or experience. However, it is almost universally true that countries are keen to 
learn about institutions in neighbouring countries.  A regional perspective can highlight 
in what way neighbouring countries may learn from each other but also the limitations of 
merely looking regionally.  
                                                 
6 This discussion is based on World Bank, 2001, and background work done for the report.    6
How Much  Do Courts Matter?
7 
Increasing evidence from around the world suggests that when court performance 
improves, it can support economic development by facilitating market transactions.
8 To 
take an example, China, in 1979 undertook an economic reform program that provided 
incentives for new enterprise creation, increased inter-provincial trade, and allowed the 
entry of foreign investors. With business expanding, the number of cases filed in 
commercial courts increased dramatically. Between 1979-82, and 1997 there has been 
more than a 100-fold increase in the average number of commercial disputes filed in the 
courts. Beginning from around 14,000 a year; by 1997, 1.5 million new cases had been 
filed. What is telling is that at about the same time, the number of commercial disputes 
arbitrated by community committees, the traditional mediation mechanism, hardly 
increased. 
9 Liberalisation, more trade within the country and business with foreigners 
meant an increased demand for formal dispute resolution mechanisms. In this context, 
community mechanisms were not appropriate for resolving disputes with non-community 
members. 
Poland and Slovakia in the early 1990s also demonstrate how regime change can 
render existing dispute resolution mechanisms ineffective and how the state can step in to 
promote business in a new economic environment. During these early years, farmers 
faced long delays in payments for produce delivered upstream. They had difficulty in  
enforcing contracts with outside business partners. Responding to this challenge, small 
farmers, and later, firms processing produce, changed their strategy and integrated their 
                                                 
7 See also World Bank, 2001. 
8 In this paper, I focus on the effectiveness of the judicial system in the commercial function of courts- 
enforcing contracts between private parties.  
9 WDR 2002, “Building Institutions for Markets”, World Bank, 2001; and Pie (2001).   7
businesses vertically. Through vertical integration contracts outside the firm were 
minimized- a preferred solution given the cost of enforcement. The government 
recognized the importance of court development- in the late 1990s a strengthened court 
enforcement system meant that industry no longer had to devise alternative methods of 
reducing risk and could diversify business dealings.
10  
Another study (Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999) shows that when judicial 
systems are strong, countries tend to have larger firms. Firms can rely on courts to protect 
their property rights and enforce increasingly sophisticated contracts, for example 
property rights associated with intellectual property. Pinheiro and Cabral  (1998) discuss 
how states in Brazil with better performing courts have more developed credit markets. 
As is intuitively obvious, creditors are loath to advance credit when they lack the means 
to enforce repayment.  For the post communist countries, Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (2000) discuss how well functioning courts support the development of new 
relationships so that entrepreneurs are encouraged to contract with new suppliers. 
Without well functioning courts, firms are forced to rely only on “relationship 
business”—that is, contracting with those with whom they already have well established 
relations. In a rapidly changing economic environment such constraints prevent firms 
from venturing into potentially very profitable opportunities. They also limit the extent to 
which they are able to protect themselves from relationships that are no longer profitable.  
Foley (2000) shows how the development of formal bankruptcy proceedings, in 
which costs play a key role, make both debtors and creditors better off. Bigsten et al 
(2000) and Collier and Gunning (1999) analyse countries in Africa. They find that 
ineffective courts and weak legal systems prevented the growth of small firms or limited 
                                                 
10 World Bank, 2001, Gow and  Swinnen 2001.   8
investment. In Zimbabwe, a country with a better legal and judicial system than many of 
its neighbours, firms are more likely to take disputes to court and at the same time more 
likely to engage in more risky (and potentially more productive) activities than in these 
neighbouring countries.
11  
Each of these experiences shows the importance of a sound court system for 
commercial transactions and explain the words of Douglas North (1990) who claimed 
that the absence of low cost means of enforcing contracts was “the most important source 
of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World”.
12  
Indeed, the evidence suggests that providing better courts – more accessible, faster, 
fairer
13  and predictable courts can support the development of economic activity.  
Reform in many countries today could bring definite benefits in terms of stronger market 
activity.  
Developing countries have been undergoing vast economic and social changes. 
The advent of more open and larger markets have presented opportunities, but also, in 
many cases rendered less efficient, community mechanisms for contract enforcement 
(World Bank, 2001). This is to be expected. As economic transactions become more 
distant in time and space, as the transactions conducted with those outside of one’s 
normal social or kin group extends, monitoring becomes difficult.  Reputational and 
social bonds weaken and cannot be used to enforce contracts. In these situations, a third 
party system such as an unbiased and effective state-sponsored court, acceptable to 
                                                 
11 Bigsten et al (2000). 
12 North 1990, 1999. 
13 As is well known, these dimensions of quality are not independent of each other. Improvements that 
increase access could increase delay and improvements which reduce delay temporarily could increase 
demand and therefore increase delay again.   9
agents from different groups is needed to enforce contracts.
14 
15Another issue with 
community mechanisms is that they can also be exclusionary. For example, they may not 
be available to women, or the truly indigent.  
How Do Sound Courts Develop? 
It is relatively easy to find examples which show the critical role that formal 
courts have played in market activities. Similarly, there are many examples of how 
private mechanisms of property rights enforcement have been critical to the development 
of business. Bernstein (2001) discusses how private dispute resolution mechanisms 
facilitated grain trade in the United States. What is more difficult is understanding how 
the two systems fit together, how they support each other and what provided the 
incentives and impetus for development.  
Study of economic history does not easily help identify the sequence of events 
that led to the development of formal courts. Typically, strong states with a desire to 
encourage commerce or alternatively, to limit feuds over land and inheritance, 
established courts funded and/or managed by the state.  These systems often competed 
with existing private institutions and over time as the state became stronger and 
performed better, replaced some of these mechanisms.  
The establishment of the royal courts after the Norman invasion of England 
provides lessons for countries today. At that time, disputes in England were generally 
settled by feudal or local courts. However, the Norman invaders did not consider these 
courts to be effective in terms of sustaining social stability and in ensuring productive use 
of the land. Disputes took a long time to be settled and this was both socially and 
                                                 
14 See Messick (2001), and Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990, and Greif, 1994. 
15 The Genoese in the tenth century recognized this, as did the old English and French empires.    10
economically costly. Thus, they established royal courts to handle disputes as an 
alternative to the traditional courts: the two systems co-existed  and in a sense competed 
with each other . Over time, disputes that were once heard by feudal courts or local courts 
were increasingly brought to the royal courts because of the latter’s streamlined 
procedures and more effective remedies.  In cases arising from the seizure of land, a 
common problem in 13
th century England, the royal courts offered a speedy and 
uncomplicated method for restoring the land to the rightful owners. By contrast, it could 
take other tribunals decades to restore possession to the rightful owner as the trespasser 
took advantage of various procedural devises to delay a decision being reached.
16 The 
English experience shows that by providing better rules and fostering competition the 
new state established a system that people chose to use.  
In more recent history, the development of a specialized commercial court in 
Tanzania was spurred by a coalition of the domestic and international community. Strong 
leadership, which responded favourably to business needs played a key role (Finnegan, 
2001). The main incentive of business was to compete effectively in an open economic 
environment. 
Development history teaches that changes in politics and economics can create 
demand for new institutions among private citizens, but also that supplying or 
introducing new institutions (as the English did) can change behaviour- as long as it is 
done the right way. Competition and openness are among two strong forces that have 
worked in favour of judicial system strengthening. But the incentives to behave 
differently must be embodied in the design of the new institutions not just the 
environment in which they operate. Rewards for using and abiding by new rules (in this 
                                                 
16  Stenton (1964), Pollack and Maitland (1968); Van Caenegem (1988).   11
case faster dispute settlement at low cost) and penalties for not doing so (in this case 
protracted disputes with high cost) were sufficient incentives. 
Of course the question immediately arises, how much do we want people to use 
state sponsored justice - the formal courts? Do we want all types of  disputes to end up in 
court? While most disputes are settled away from courts through negotiations, mediation 
or arbitration (or sometimes by fiat, depending on the system), how much access is 
warranted? And, how inefficient does a court system have to be before reform is 
warranted?  
A court system (and associated legal system) that serves the population is not one 
such that every citizen will have incentives to come to court for every dispute large and 
small. Neither is it one that barely has relevance for most of the country’s citizens. It 
means identifying some ideal level of relevance such that people have faith in the system 
and believe that it upholds justice and does it efficiently – this faith will help resolution of 
disputes outside and inside the courts. It means structuring the legal and judicial system 
such that the incentives for appropriate behaviour are there while the costs to society are 
kept as low as possible. There are no ideal ratios of formal versus informal mechanisms 
that one should aspire to; neither is there an absolute standard of efficiency. So answering 
these questions is a difficult matter- with the judgment to be made by each country’s 
government and citizens, with the help of evidence and data. Data gathered on the system 
will help stakeholders form judgments about where they are and where they should strive 
to be. 
In a country where the majority of the population operate outside the system,   12
access to the courts is probably too low and courts too slow, biased, or unpredictable.
 17   
Access may be hampered by financial reasons or because there may be little 
understanding of the formal system. Courts may be “too slow” because of the incentives 
provided to various participants or lack of resources/capacity. Governments, and citizens 
broadly agree that in these countries, constituting much of the developing world, reforms 
which increase efficiency in terms of speed, make courts fairer and more accessible, are 
necessary to make the formal legal and judicial system relevant for most of the people, 
and are therefore highly desirable.  Such reforms can change what is often called the 
“culture” of the business community. Businesses respond to incentives: clear definition 
and enforcement of property rights provides incentives to act that are different from a 
situation in which these two factors do not exist.  
The need for reform of judicial systems becomes even clearer when we look at 
what citizens think of their systems. While it is a difficult matter to evaluate how 
efficient
18 judicial systems really are, indices have been constructed which reflect 
people’s perceptions of their judiciary’s performance. As the charts below show for a 
sample of countries, high income countries have judicial systems that are perceived to be 
much more efficient, to enforce contracts better, to give more access to people, and to be 
less corrupt than those of the lower and middle income countries.
19 The differences 
between the latter two groups are small except for access to justice.
20 
21 
                                                 
17 By unpredictable I mean that there is little faith in the ability of the justice system to render consistent 
solutions to disputes. An unbiased or fair system is meant to be one where the law is applied as written and 
people perceive the adjudication processes to be generally fair. 
18 I am using the term “efficient” in a broad sense to cover the concepts of cost, speed and fairness. 
19 Note that the corruption indices refer to overall perceptions of corruption in the country and not just in 
the judiciary.  
20 Sometimes perceptions of overall corruption may be different from perceptions of how corrupt the 
judiciary is.   13
Perceptions of access to justice - that is whether you are actually able to use the 
courts are much worse in low income countries relative to middle and high income 
countries.  Access may be affected by a number of things but cost (both financial and 
non-financial) is probably a key factor. It is important to remember that these scores do 
not give us absolute standards- there is always room for improvement. A closer look 
reveals that within the low income group, none of the measures of judicial performance 
vary much with income.  In other words, either income has to reach some threshold level 
before the performance of the formal sector is affected or factors other than income play 
a key role in establishing effective judiciaries for these countries. Probably both reasons 
are valid. Formal government structures that are efficient are also expensive to establish 
and maintain and they strain government’s non-financial capacity- which is limited in 
many developing countries.  
Perceptions regarding judicial performance matter since one can expect that at 
least  to a certain extent, they reflect actual performance. Moreover, the behaviour of 
individuals will more likely be affected and they will more likely follow the law and use 
their judicial system if they perceive it to be efficient.  It follows that if people believe 
that the formal judicial system is not efficient, that it does not deliver benefits 
commensurate with the costs of using it, then they will use it less and it will tend to be  
less relevant for the majority of the people. 
The situation depicted in Figure 1 suggests that there could be substantial benefits 
in redesigning judicial systems so that people’s perceptions improve and so they induce 
people to behave as intended by substantive law.  
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Note that the sample (see annex 1) is divided in the following manner: the top 25% are considered rich, 
the next 50% are considered middle income and the bottom 25% poor.   14
Figure  1 
Judicial System Indicators























Source:Judicial Efficiency from ICRG; Citizen’s Access to Justice from World Business 
Environment Survey; Control of Corruption from ICRG; Enforcement from Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence; GNP from World Bank. 
 
The Value of a Comparative Approach 
How can governments build legal and judicial systems that serve the population  
while minimizing the costs of such an undertaking for society?  In which direction should 
court reform go- which institutional structure / design should be adopted?  The manner in 
which the judiciary is organized and the rules and regulations that different individuals / 
entities in an economy follow vary tremendously from country to country. The diversity 
jumps out by just considering simple numbers on how may lawyers and judges there are 
in a given country (see Table 1). It is clear when one considers the different ways that 
judges’ benefits and tenure (La Porta et al 2001) may be determined, and how lawyers 
may be rewarded. For example lawyers may be paid by the hour regardless of the 
outcome of the case or they may be paid only if the outcome settles in the client’s favour. 
Or they may have fixed fees depending on the nature of the transactions. The market for 
lawyers’ fees may or may not be competitive.     15
Just noting the diversity in institutional design, and attributing it all to social 
conditions and culture while interesting in itself, does not take the work of policymakers 
very far. For example, Germany has a very high ratio of professional judges relative to 
the number of incoming cases in first instance courts. The question is why do the 
numbers for Germany vary so much from England which has a much lower number? Is 
one system more efficient (in terms of speed) than the other, or cheaper, and might the 
countries learn from each others’ experience? Is it because cases are screened before 
coming to court in England and only some come to these courts and is this a better 
solution in some circumstances?  Are there fees which make the difference—and what 
economic /social benefit does the structural difference confer?   
To bring about change we need to understand what might be the reasons for the 
diversity (e.g. which social and economic factors prompted the adoption of particular 
institutional features) and what might be the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each system for different people and for society as a whole. Until the existing data on 
judicial systems and new data collected across countries are analysed in this manner, 
unless the impact on welfare and the costs to society are analysed, such data will be of 
little use to those seeking for a better way of doing things. 
Table 1: Inputs Into the Judicial System for Selected Countries, 1995 





Incoming cases in first-
instance courts 
Austria 21  117 29,294a
England and Wales  5  4 4,718
France 10  41 2,242
Germany 27 69 2,655
Italy 12  60 1,227
Netherlands 10  n.a. 2,031
Portugal 12  70 3,719
Spain 9  83 1,898
a. Including summary cases. 
Source: Contini 2000   16
Designing reform however, is complicated by the fact that there is little available 
data and research on many countries, particularly poor countries. Second, there are few 
systematic comparisons on how judicial systems actually operate around the world and 
what might account for differences in performance between countries, and even different 
localities within the same country. Even when the data exist, are kept together and 
analysed, they may not be used in the design of reform; reformers having shown a 
preference to basing their strategies on theories. Such an attitude can lead to reforms 
being chosen which, with the help of more systematic analysis would not have been 
implemented (Murrell, 2001).  
As legal and economic scholars have noted, each country’s particular political and 
economic development process has affected the evolution of the legal and judicial 
system. Many scholars believe that the law reflects the spirit and social codes of the 
people. Others point out that people with very different social codes  have developed 
greatly similar legal systems - at least regarding specific rules of contract law (Watson 
1993)
22 and Shapiro (1999)). As Epstein (1995) suggests “Every system of law must 
address the acquisition of property, the limitations on the use of force, the enforceability 
of promises, the creation of state franchises and privileges, and the collection of taxes 
and the expenditures of public revenues”. Certainly, if one considers the increasing 
formal demand for court-led dispute resolution in countries as diverse as China and 
Slovakia, or Brazil, one would tend to agree. 
   Given that the nature of the legal and judicial system is to some extent particular 
to a country and to some extent not, the important empirical question is: what do we gain 
by researching and studying the judicial systems of other countries? Should policymakers 
                                                 
22 See also Cohen and Cohen (1951) Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosopy.   17
and scholars focus only on studying their own systems? One cannot argue with the 
proposition that knowing oneself is essential. But knowing oneself only leads to a very 
limited view of what might be the whole set of possibilities. Moreover the world is 
changing and all countries want to keep up.  
In an increasingly international world, the businessman who needs to contract 
with partners in foreign countries obviously would prefer to do so in a country with a 
sound legal and judicial system and one he understands. Both host and foreign country 
entities will benefit from this knowledge. Third, governments and those involved in 
building legal and judicial systems have, throughout history, used their knowledge about 
other systems to improve their country’s institutions. This might be one of the reasons for 
the similarity in laws observed across many countries, as noted by Watson and Shapiro. It 
is easily argued that systematic study will probably lead to better solutions. Fourth, many 
developing countries today have been forced to adopt legal and judicial systems from 
colonizing powers. To understand how these systems may work better in their own 
countries- some research would help. Fifth, multilateral companies and organizations are 
busy constructing international agreements which depend on strong domestic legal and 
judicial systems for their enforcement: a knowledge of how one’s country fits in with the 
rest of the world is becomingly increasingly important in this complex world.  The 
implementation of rules set by the World Trade Organisation in the biotechnology area is 
one example. 
What research and study can offer is a better way to integrate with the outside 
world and a better way to embark on a reform process within one’s own country: the 
knowledge base to make the best choices for a country. To quote esteemed scholars of   18
comparative law “Legislators all over the world have found that on many matters good 
laws cannot be produced without the assistance of comparative law, whether in the form 
of general studies or of reports specially prepared on the topic in question”  (Zweigert 
and Kotz, 1987). Similarly, the great German jurist Rudolph Jhering states that: “The 
reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and 
need...” 
23 
While accepting that study of law in other countries can help lawmakers and the 
judiciary develop their own systems, a relevant question is to what extent should 
domestic institutional design
24 be affected by those abroad? To quote Zweigert and Kotz 
(1987) : Should one, in using the comparative law method of interpretation, consult only 
related systems like those of Switzerland and France, or also systems that are quite 
different in style, such as the Common Law or the law of socialist states? Can the judge 
choose whichever of the foreign solutions seems to him the best, or can he choose only a 
solution which is common to a number of other systems? May we, with the help of 
comparative law, reach an interpretation of our legal rules which is independent of , 
perhaps even at odds with , the conceptual structure of our own system? These questions, 
with the possible exception of the last one, should receive a bold rather than a timid 
answer.”   
Details Matter 
Looking at the judicial system in its entirety and comparing the whole set of 
institutions affecting judicial performance across countries is a major task and not within 
the scope of any single project. In making any comparison, the first step is to think about 
                                                 
23 (in Zweigert and Kotz, 1987). 
24 By institutional design I mean both the design of laws, and the organization and rules that make up the 
whole legal and judicial system.   19
which functions (and which transactions) of the judiciary should be the area of focus. 
First, there are the general broad categories to choose between such as commercial 
transactions, family and inheritance related legal issues, or criminal issues. In this paper I 
will discuss commercial transactions though much of what is written may be relevant for 
other areas of dispute as well.  
Second, it is necessary to choose particular transactions on which to focus. The 
most basic transaction in any economic sphere is the extension of credit and the 
repayment of debt.  There are several additional considerations. For example, should one 
consider debt of all sizes or limit the number of cases and enhance comparability by 
limiting the magnitude? Should one look at debt due to banks or to any agent? Should 
one focus on rural or urban areas? Should one consider disputes that entered the appeals 
process or not? 
Even after having narrowed the focus of attention, for each transaction there are 
several potential institutional  elements
25 which may affect the performance of the 
judiciary in adjudicating disputes and in enforcing decisions/judgements. How  each 
institutional arrangement performs depends on the incentives it provides to various 
actors, the resources available to these people  and the skills/education of the agents who 
operate within the system. It depends on the ability of others to monitor actions and 
consequences as well as on the magnitude and scope of the associated rewards and 
penalties for actions taken. For example, if there is no way of knowing that judges in a 
given jurisdiction take longer than all the others to adjudicate similar cases, and if there is 
no way of knowing why this is so, then regardless of any injunctions in the law or moral 
                                                 
25 By institutions I mean rules and regulations including their enforcement mechanisms. This definition is 
broad enough to cover formal laws and social codes.   20
exhortations aimed at reducing delay, there will be little incentive to change behaviour. 
Yet monitoring alone is not sufficient. If there is no one to penalize poor performance 
once it becomes known, then information only serves to the extent that reputational 
penalties matter. Monitoring mechanisms, reward, and penalty systems vary between 
countries; yet effective institution building means explicitly considering how these 
elements fit together. There are broadly six groups of agents who are directly responsible 
for the performance of the judicial system in each transaction: judges, those who assist 
them (e.g. clerks), lawyers and legal aides, litigants, the state and external agencies.  
External agencies are those which are not related to any other parties mentioned. 
These are entities such as domestic and international NGOs, media companies/ 
journalists, and research or policy institutes studying the judiciary. Examples include 
Transparency International, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Bulgaria, or the 
Policy Research Institute in Hong Kong.  External agencies affect the performance of the 
judiciary in two ways: First they monitor information on processes and outcomes and 
disseminate it. Second, they analyse the information they obtain and present this to 
interested stakeholders. These actions have two effects: first, they allow stakeholders to 
evaluate performance, including comparative performance and take action / impose 
sanctions; second, they have an impact on the reputation of those involved, such as 
judges, litigants or particular government officials. Each of these individuals cares about 
both their reputations in both  professional and social spheres (see Bernstein, 2001 and 
Dyck, 2002), and may adjust their behaviour to “safeguard” their reputations and avoid 
the possibility of public humiliation.   21
Both public and private institutions play a critical role in affecting the incentives 
and the abilities of each of these agents to perform efficiently. For example, the 
government sets rules for judges’ promotion and penalties for underperformance. Private 
business such as the media may affect reputation of judges and lawyers and therefore 
performance. Government regulations can affect the market for legal services but so can 
private lawyers’ associations. These associations may determine the degree of 
competition in the economy or standards for legal education, or moral /ethical standards 
for lawyers. These arrangements can affect how litigants behave and how court cases are 
conducted. They can affect perceptions of access to, and fairness in, the courts. 
Institutional arrangements which determine how courts are funded (such as court fees) or 
how lawyers are paid can affect which agents choose to use the courts, how long they 
remain in court and how often they use them. Therefore they also affect measures of 
judicial performance such as access or delay.
26  Table 2 shows the myriad institutional 
factors which may affect the incentives of some of the various players and thus judicial 
performance. 
Table 2 also leaves out some important elements which affect judicial 
performance. First, it does not completely address the incentives of the state to let the 
judiciary operate independently.  Judges may “do the right thing” but their actions may 
be overturned by government . The institutional arrangements guaranteeing the 




                                                 
26 Some of these issues are discussed in Botero et al (2001) and Messick (1997).   22
Table 2: Elements of Institutional Design Which Affect Court Performance 







Mechanisms which affect reputation: ex 
post evaluation mechanisms within the 
judiciary for specific aspects such as 
delay (individual calendars and keeping 
of statistics on performance); external 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 
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Promotion criteria,  
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mandatory time limits, case 
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27 
 
Legal clarity: Substantive and Procedural 
Law 
 
Rules regarding who may provide what 
service: competition with other providers 
 
How budgets are allocated (e.g. whether 
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Requirements in the 
law for legal 
representation 
 












Difficulty of process; 
 
Size of claim. 
* Most aspects affect incentives to go to court in the first place. 
 
Second, there are myriad systems of alternative dispute resolution (ADRs), formal 
or informal, which may substitute for or complement the courts. These too will typically 
affect both the incentives of agents to go to court and their behaviour while there. When 
courts are predictable and accessible, the formal legal system provides a baseline for what 
the parties may achieve in any substitute system and litigants may use other ways to settle 
disputes before coming to court. If these methods are effective there may be fewer court-
led disputes and therefore faster time to adjudication. ADRs are important  because they 
also provide competition for the formal courts when they work well. Finally, the table 
                                                 
27 Others are rules that determine the tenure of supreme court judges and whether citizens can freely ask the 
judiciary to review  administrative acts of government (see World Bank 2001 and La Porta et al, 2001)   23
does not address the incentives of third party monitoring mechanisms (such as NGOs and 
the Media). 
Even when incentives (determined to a great extent by institutional design) are 
aligned to produce effective justice, other factors affect the ability of the judicial system 
to deliver. For example, the magnitude of the budget determines how many 
administrative staff and aides each judge has and how many computers he has at his 
disposal. The training and education level of judges and lawyers affect how well a law is 
understood and applied. Training of legal aides influences how effectively judges do their 
work. Income and education levels affect people’s understanding of the formal legal 
system. The general flow of information that is available to citizens in an economy (e.g. 
through the media) also determines their understanding of their legal and judicial 
systems.  
Table 2 illustrates some key institutional features which affect the incentives of 
various parties to take their cases to court and their behaviour while there. However, 
enforcement of judicial decisions may be the critical factor negatively affecting 
perceptions of judicial performance and the responsibility for ensuring enforcement 
usually resides with the police and/or other state institutions. Scandinavian countries have 
a special Enforcement Commissioner, Germany relies on a bailiff. In common law 
countries the court order may be delivered privately to the debtor whereas in civil and 
socialist law countries the order is delivered by a bailiff or another officer of the court.  
Usually, the actual execution of  the court order – seizing property, auction, garnishment, 
is performed by law enforcement authorities (police, sheriff’s office, etc.) although some   24
countries have dedicated judgment enforcement agencies (sometimes part of the fiscal 
authorities).  
Table 2 does not set priorities for reform – it lists the different areas in which 
judicial reform may lead to improved judicial performance. The priorities for reform will 
differ from country to country, with the priority areas being the one(s) in which action 
will yield the greatest result or where lack of action is having the greatest negative impact 
on performance. 
How Much Does Legal Tradition Matter? 
Scholars and practitioners in the legal and economics profession distinguish 
between different types of legal systems. Typically attention has focused on the 
differences between  the civil and common law traditions France and Germany being  the 
main originators of the former and England of the latter.  
The main European legal traditions were exported to countries around the world 
with conquests.  The colonised lands were missing one of the two ingredients which 
would have led to a better assimilation of the colonisers’ legal traditions. The first was 
that the political and social context which made the laws relevant for the colonisers did 
not exist in the colonised land. And second, existing economic conditions did not provide 
sufficient incentives for assimilation. In most of the colonised countries, native 
populations were not required to use the colonial law. Some of these countries however, 
adopted the ex-colonial legal system as their own at independence though sometimes 
only partially.  
Tunisia follows Islamic family law and inheritance law but commercial law is 
based on the French civil law tradition. Yet even when the colonial law was adopted for   25
the country, it has still failed to have relevance for a vast majority of the people who did 
not understand it, who were not trained to use it, for whom the formal administrative 
structure were too costly to access, and who did not have the resources to make it 
function. I would like to draw attention to the words of Mattei (1998) “the common law 
vs. civil law dichotomy probably does not mean much in Africa. The level of the civil law 
vs. common law opposition is limited to a remarkably superficial layer of the legal 
system, certainly a layer that would be wasteful to approach by itself if one hopes to 
reform the law.” Though he overstates the case, to the extent that Mattei considers that 
less formal/costly methods of dispute resolution need to  be considered, it would be hard 
to argue with him.  
Some scholars contend that France and Germany in fact look quite different from 
other countries following the French or German tradition (Merryman, 1985). France and 
Germany in fact present striking evidence of how dynamic is the process of legal change 
when countries are faced with changing economic and political forces. One might argue 
that one of the reasons that the originators of civil law look so different from their 
followers today is that economic interests in these countries had to contend with 
competitive pressures from surrounding countries, notable among them, England. 
Competition will induce governments to undertake institutional change to protect their 
own economic interests. 
All this to say that where many developing countries find themselves today partly 
reflects the vagaries of history and that history will be a partial guide to the future. The 
relevant question is how much to innovate and how much to work with what is already  
there.  Looking forward, there are important choices that each country can make which   26
can improve the performance of their legal and judicial systems. The remainder of the 
paper focuses on one area of potential reform. 
Procedural Complexity 
Clearly, it would be an impossible feat to discuss all the  elements which affect 
judicial performance in a single paper.
28 As stated earlier in the paper, this paper aims to 
illustrate some general principles and discuss certain aspects of procedural law in this 
context. The focus on legal procedure does not imply that it has been found to be 
universally the most important or pressing area for judicial reform. Just as countries differ 
in the design of their laws and other institutions, so they differ in terms of where reform 
needs are the greatest. In this section, I base the discussion on a recent project initiated 
jointly by the World Bank, Harvard University and Lex Mundi, (the Project) analysed 
empirically (looking at a sample of over 100 countries) how excessive formalism affects 
judicial performance.
29 Since this Project is unique in that it covers a large number of 
countries it allows for comparisons between countries. 
The Project focuses on a commercial transaction relevant for the everyday lives of 
ordinary people: small debt collection and it also studies another non-related transaction, 
tenant eviction, as a “control” event. The project is summarized in Annexes 2 and 3 
which are from the World Bank, 2001 and Djankov et al 2003. It assesses how many 
procedural steps are required from the time notice is served to a debtor in default until 
enforcement of the court’s decision. The construction of the index which I will refer to as 
procedural complexity is described in Djankov et al (2003).  
                                                 
28 Botero et al (2002) provide a good summary of the existing literature which addresses country experience 
with judicial reform. 
29 This project was originally undertaken for the World Development Report, 2002, World Bank, 2001. See 
Djankov et al (2003) for a detailed description. See also Annex 3.   27
 Legal procedure may be viewed as “providing the means by which substantive 
legal rules are ultimately enforced” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2002). While substantive law 
determines the rights of parties under different scenarios, procedural law determines how 
these rights are enforced in practice.  Both substantive law and legal procedures affect the 
incentives of individuals to act in a certain way (e.g. to fulfill contracts or not). For 
example,  if a debtor does not pay his debt then the probability that the creditors will take 
him to court and the expected outcome when there matters (assuming social 
norms/networks and ADRs cannot solve the problem). If it is costly to intervene through 
the courts relative to the benefits expected or if courts are unpredictable, it is less likely 
that people will use the courts and less likely the substantive content of the law will 
influence behaviour; that is it is more likely that the debtor will not honour his contract. 
What is meant by complexity? To quote Epstein: the cheaper the cost of 
compliance the simpler we can say the rule is….the minimum condition for calling any 
rule complex is that it creates public regulatory obstacles to the achievement of some 
private objective. ..how much simplicity is required? To answer this question it is 
essential to consider the great trade-off, namely, that between social incentives and 
administrative costs. …  does the creation of some administrative structure - hiring a 
police force, formulating rules, electing people to public office, …- also create some 
desirable incentives for individual behaviour such that the gain from this particular 
administrative expenditure is justified in terms of the overall improvement in incentive 
structures?
30 
                                                 
30 In the words of another legal scholar, Steven Shavell: In many cases simpler is better: especially when 
resources are scarce and the marginal social benefits to increased complexity are slight.   28
 It is obvious that any system which is more costly to use in terms of financial or 
other resources will be less likely to be used for disputes where the claim is relatively 
small. To the extent that smaller businesses and poorer individuals are more likely to 
have disputes which are of lower value financially, they will be less likely to use the 
courts, particularly when doing so is costly. Which claims should be settled in the courts 
depends on broad considerations of how the ability to access courts affects overall 
welfare and economic development. Overall welfare depends on both the behaviour of 
the parties (ex ante to bringing the suit to the court) as well as the costs of litigation.  
These costs have to be weighed against any benefits that would actually be attainable 
from a given design, particularly in developing countries where implementation capacity 
is weak.  
Procedural complexity or formalism raises the costs of dispute resolution; 
complex systems tend to be more opaque and  tend to have other negative consequences. 
For example, as discussed in Djankov et al, 2003, they are perceived to be less efficient, 
have greater delay on average, may facilitate corruption and are perceived to be less 
accessible.  
The Project found that poor countries on average have a higher degree of 
procedural complexity for the debt collection and tenant eviction cases mentioned above. 
A close look at the data reveals that a number of rich countries also have a high degree of 
procedural complexity, Austria, and Greece being examples. In fact Austria’s complexity 
index derived from the Project is higher than that of Pakistan (see Table 3). However, 
perceived efficiency and access are much higher than that of Pakistan . 
 



















Austria  6.30 6.07 9.50 7.50 8.25 8.57
Pakistan  4.21 4.21 5.00 0.00 3.85 2.98
 Sources: Formalism Index:  Djankov et al. (2003);  Judicial Efficiency Index: ICRG; Citizens’ Access to 
Justice: World Business Environment Survey; Enforcement Index: Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence; Control of Corruption: ICRG. 
 
 There are several possible explanations for this, all of which are probably true. 
First, there are other factors besides procedural complexity which affect perceptions of 
efficiency or access and these may be more important in some countries. Second, in rich 
countries administrative capacity, and other institutional designs (see Table 2) including 
ADR systems may be more developed; therefore citizens may be better able to deal with 
procedural complexity, or to counteract some of the negative effects associated with 
procedural complexity. Third, while comparative values for indices tell us how countries 
fare relative to each other, they do not tell us what is the appropriate level of the index for 
a particular country. For example, while a score of 2.42 may be “small” enough for 
Denmark, it may not be so for Malawi.
31  In fact, no score will be “small enough” for 
Malawi if Malawi does not have court structures in suitably accessible places: something 
which is not picked up by the data.
32  
While the data discussed above and some of which is shown in Table 3 deals only 
with relatively simple and small transactions, the general principles, stemming from 
common sense and supported by some empirical evidence, should hold for all types of 
commercial transaction which are disputed in the courts.  
                                                 
31 The theoretical benefits of formalism and the practical experience is discussed later in the book.  
32 For example if parties must travel long distances to courts, the likelihood of using courts falls even 
further and the relevance of courts declines.   30
  A closer look at the data reveals some interesting variations when the countries in 
the sample are grouped regionally.  
East Asia 
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High Income Countries East Asian Countries
 
Fig.1 Sources:  Judicial Efficiency Index: ICRG; Citizens’ Access to Justice: World Business Environment 
Survey; Enforcement Index: Business Environmental Risk Intelligence; Control of Corruption: ICRG. 
Fig.2 Source: Djankov et al. (2003) 
  The East Asian countries in the sample score lower on various performance 
indicators and on average have more procedural complexity than high income countries 
(statistically significant at the 5% level). Figure 3 shows an index measuring overall 
procedural complexity for both the check collection and eviction cases.  
  A number of procedures seem to matter particularly: for example whether or not 
professionals are required to represent the litigants in court, whether the procedure relies 
on judges who have undergone complete training or not
33, whether or not there is a 
specialized court (such as a small claims court). Other aspects which are important are 
the nature of the legal justification required (how formal a justification is required), the 
number of independent procedural actions required (that is how many actual steps are 
needed in the filing and service of a complaint, trial and judgement and enforcement), 
and how the presentation of evidence is regulated (e.g. only certified documents are 
                                                 
33 Dispute resolution may also be conducted by an arbitrator, or an administrative officer, practicing 
merchant etc.   31
accepted). The use of written procedures only may also limit access to the judicial 
system. 
Table 4 shows how long enforcement related to disputes takes. The first column 
shows the time lag between filing of a complaint and a summons to court. The second 
column shows the time taken for adjudication and the third column shows the time taken 
for enforcement after adjudication. Korea and the Phillipines seem to do particularly well 
in enforcement of judicial decisions for check collection. In the UK and in the US for 
example, it takes 14 days after adjudication for enforcement. Of note is the fact that the 
Project also highlighted that establishing mandatory time limits for the various steps in 
adjudication, seemed to have little effect on delay or perceptions of efficiency once   
procedural complexity is accounted for.  
  Table 4.   Duration: East Asian Countries 




































































































































































































































































































































































































China 15  105  60  180 165  15  120  45  180  165 
Korea 30  180  93  303 273  20 40  15  75  55 
Malaysia 60  90  120 270 210  15  15  60 90 75 
Thailand 30  510  90  630 600  30  90  90  210  180 
Vietnam 35  55  60 150 115  35  35  50  120  85 
Indonesia 30  165  30  225 195  30  165  30  225  195 
Philippines 42 97  25  164 122  42  97  25  164 122 
Source:World Bank 2001 and Djankov et al. (2003) 
Enforcement of a decision in the check collection case takes significantly longer 
in French but not in other civil law countries relative to common law countries on 
average. The reasons for this are not clear at this stage. This does not mean however that 
countries whose legal systems are based on the French civil law system will be 
constrained in the future by the nature of their legal systems from achieving better results.   32
Indonesia and the Phillipines are examples of French civil law countries where 
enforcement is actually faster than in many other countries. 
Africa 
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High Income Countries African Countries
 
Fig.3 Sources:  Judicial Efficiency Index: ICRG; Citizens’ Access to Justice: World Business Environment 
Survey; Enforcement Index: Business Environmental Risk Intelligence; Control of Corruption: ICRG. 
Fig.4 Source:World Bank 2001 and Djankov et al. 2001 
A close look at the data on procedural complexity shows that there is a significant 
difference in the level of procedural complexity in Africa relative to the high income 
countries in the sample (at the 5% confidence level) and particularly in the statutory 
regulation of evidence in Africa
34. The sample of African countries shows a higher 
degree of formalism relative to the E. Asian sample. A comparison of common law 
African and rich countries shows that despite the similar legal background, there is a 
substantial difference in the level of statutory regulation of evidence, the degree of 
intervention by the appellate courts (control of superior review), and the degree of other 
statutory interventions – all significant at the 5% confidence level.  The common law 
African countries have less procedural complexity than the civil law ones and faster 
dispute resolution and better control of corruption. 
                                                 
34 In this sample, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe follow the English common law tradition, while Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Mozambique, Senegal, and Tunisia follow the French civil law system.      33
The evidence (looking at the individual components of the complexity index) 
suggests that reforms to decrease formalism, by decreasing the written component in 
procedures, simplifying rules for the presentation of evidence; and simplifying and 
limiting the appeals process in the group of African countries may show results in terms 
of faster adjudication and less corruption, ceteris paribus.   
Latin America (LAC) 
As Figure 6 shows, judicial efficiency is rated higher in wealthy countries than in 
the LAC countries in the sample.  Similar conclusions are reached with respect to the 
perception of citizens’ access to justice, corruption, and the level of contract enforcement. 





























High Income Countries LAC Countries















High Income Countries LAC Countries
 
Fig.5 Sources:  Judicial Efficiency Index: ICRG; Citizens’ Access to Justice: World Business Environment 
Survey; Enforcement Index: Business Environmental Risk Intelligence; Control of Corruption: ICRG. 
Fig.6 Source: Djankov et al. (2003) 
 
The data show that the degree of procedural complexity in the LAC region is 
significantly higher than in the sample of high income countries (at the 5% confidence 
level) and in some of its major subcategories – notably in the amount of statutory 
regulation of evidence required for these simple cases, as well as other statutory   
interventions; the use of appeals; and in the overall number of independent procedural 
actions required for resolution (Figure 2).  In the Central and South American countries, 
in particular, there is an almost universal right to superior review (appeals) for even the   34
most minor case (an exception is Belize).  As a result, the appeals process is often used 
by the losing party to delay enforcement even further after the already protracted court of 
first instance proceedings.  35  The LAC index for formalism is higher than that of both 
the African and E. Asian index. 
  Some examples help illustrate the severity of the problem in the LAC region: In 
Colombia, it takes on average 527 days to resolve a case of small debt collection in the 
courts, while in Peru it takes 441, and even in Argentina it takes nearly a year. The 
eviction of a delinquent tenant through court order can be even more cumbersome – 440. 
Looking at data in the other regions shows similar results.  
The project discussed here does not set absolute standards of formalism for any 
country. For example, the degree of procedural complexity in the UK, while low by the 
standards of developed countries may not be low enough for Mozambique. And reform 
towards greater simplicity in the courts of Mozambique for example, will continue to 
have little relevance if there are few courts in the country and distances traveled are large. 
Another thing that is missing is information on who actually uses the courts for the 
disputes considered. Two other caveats need to be mentioned in considered these results: 
while the project focuses on small disputes relative to GDP, in many countries the 
amounts chosen may still be large relative to the income of the vast majority of the 
population, especially where inequality is high.  
Any reform of the judicial system needs to assess how it will affect behaviour. 
                                                 
35 Common Law LAC countries exhibit substantially less regulation of dispute resolution, all of its major 
components and substantially faster resolution than their Civil Law counterparts.  Because of their small 
size, Caribbean countries are often omitted in international surveys and unfortunately, data on corruption 
containment from the Common Law LAC countries is virtually missing (exceptions are Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago).   
   35
Legal procedures are often more complex in an effort to ensure accuracy (Kaplow and 
Shavell, 2002). But instead, such complexity can lead to non-transparency and abuse. It is 
critical to ask whether the theoretical advantages attainable under a given structure 
actually attainable in practice?  
Scholars today agree that the costs of adjudicating and enforcing a decision 
should be commensurate with the importance of the case at hand. But this is not enough. 
It should be consistent with the nature and capacity of the state , with the ability of people 
it serves and would like to serve, and with the available technology and resources. If it is 
too far from the capabilities of the country and the resources available to its people, then 
the legal and judicial system cannot serve them. The work described above provides an  
indication of what types of actions may improve the performance of the legal and judicial 
system in one area and also demonstrates the value of data and research, and the value of 
a comparative approach to judicial reform.
36  
As the discussion also indicated, the nature of the overall institutional structure 
matters: whether or not ADRs exist for example, or how many courts there are. Finally, 
there are situations when procedural reform cannot improve the performance of the 
judiciary. For example when the main problem of the judiciary is high level corruption; 
that is, the judiciary is pressured or bought (financially or otherwise) by one of the 
litigants (one party may be the state) and the government is loath to take action.
37 
Usually, the parties involved in these cases are large (large companies or banks or the 
government). In these cases, external agencies such as the media and civil society can 
                                                 
36 I use a broad concept of the term “efficient”- to mean swift, fair and accessible justice. 
37 In smaller cases simplification may be enough to reduce the opportunities for corruption. It may also 
reduce the incentives for corruption if the likelihood of being caught is increased (as it would be in a more 
transparent system).   36
play a large role by providing the necessary checks and balances. In cases where the 
government is willing to reform but the judiciary is closely linked to the private sector, 
other methods which affect the incentives of judges are also warranted. The good news is 
that there are many things that can be tried. 
Conclusion. 
Integral components of an effective institutional reform strategy are country-
specific data which illustrate how a given system is working, comparative data which 
help suggest ways in which a system may improve, and an analysis which identifies the 
importance of the data collected and hypotheses formed relative to competing 
hypotheses.   
Any reform of the judiciary should ideally take into account the net benefits to 
society, to assess which an empirical and comparative approach is critical. These depend 
on how the change may affect behaviour (for example, will more people be less likely to 
default, and if they default will more creditors be more likely to use the courts) as well as 
the total cost of administering the change. To do this job more effectively is needed a 
deeper and more concrete understanding of how institutions work in other countries, how 
the various pieces fit together. 
 As governments move forward they will need to think which changes would 
complement their existing endowments. Reforms in the judiciary, just like reforms in any 
other field can be greatly enhanced if key players are open to innovation and to new ways 
of doing things. One of the ways in which ideas can be stimulated and consensus for 
reform brought about is through greater openness- both with the rest of the world and   37
 within each society. Finally, reform in small steps is also reform and it is important to 
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High Income Countries  S  Slovenia  11178 S  Lithuania  1924
G  Switzerland  48160 F  Portugal  11030 F  Dominican Rep.  1920
F  Luxembourg  42930 E  Bahrain  10760 F  El Salvador  1920
G  Japan  42783 F  Malta  9210 F  Guatemala  1680
Sc  Denmark  36923 E  Barbados  8600 F  Jordan  1630
Sc  Norway  36750 E  Anguilla  7900 F  Paraguay  1560
E  USA  31910 E  Turks and Caicos  7700 S  Bulgaria  1409
E  Bermuda  31500 F  Argentina  7550Low Income Countries 
G  Germany  31413 F  Uruguay  6220 F  Egypt  1380
G  Austria  30943 S  Czech Republic  5049 F  Ecuador  1360
Sc  Iceland  30014 S  Hungary  4976 E  Swaziland  1350
Sc  Finland  29723 E  Trinidad & Tobago 4750 S  Kazakhstan  1323
Sc  Sweden  29242 F  Chile  4630 S  Romania  1253
F  Monaco  27000 F  Mexico  4440 F  Morocco  1180
F  Netherlands  25140 F  Brazil  4350 F  Philippines  1050
F  France  24790 S  Croatia  4015 F  Bolivia  990
F  Belgium  24650 S  Estonia  3875 E  Sri Lanka  890
E  Hong Kong  24570 S  Poland  3729 S  China  840
E  Singapore  24510 F  Lebanon  3700 S  Ukraine  812
E  Cayman  24500 F  Venezuela  3680 F  Honduras  760
E  United Kingdom  23590 F  Costa Rica  3570 F  Cote D'Ivoire  670
E  Ireland  21470 E  Grenada  3440 F  Indonesia  600
E  Australia  20950 E  Malaysia  3390 E  Zimbabwe  530
F  Italy  20170 E  Botswana  3240 F  Senegal  500
E  Canada  20140 E  South Africa  3170 S  Georgia  473
F  Kuwait  19020 F  Panama  3080 E  Pakistan  470
E  UAE  17870 F  Turkey  2900 E  India  440
F  Spain  16800 E  Belize  2730 E  Ghana  400
Middle Income Countries  E  St. Vincent  2640 E  Bangladesh  370
E  Israel  16710 E  Jamaica  2430 E  Kenya  360
E  Br. Virgin Islands  15000 S  Latvia  2336 E  Zambia  330  38
E  New Zealand  13990 F  Colombia  2170 E  Uganda  320
G  Taiwan  13235 F  Peru  2130 S  Vietnam  314
F  Greece  12110 E  Namibia  2120 E  Nigeria  260
G  Korea  11958 F  Tunisia  2090 E  Tanzania  260
E  Cyprus  11950 S  Russia  2051 F  Mozambique  220
F  Neth. Antilles  11800 E  Thailand  2010 E  Malawi  180
Legal origin legend:  E– English Common Law; F– French Civil Law, G – German Civil Law; Sc –  
Scandinavian Civil Law; S – Socialist Law.  Source for GNI – World Bank data. 
 
ANNEX 2: The World Bank-Lex Mundi-Harvard University Project 
 
The Project involved implementing a survey to discover how courts work.  The data systematically 
compare the pace of litigation by means of a standardized survey delivered to private law firms.  The 
survey presents two hypothetical cases that represent typical situations of default of an everyday contract: 
(a) the eviction of a tenant; and (b) the collection of debt (a returned check or an invoice in countries where 
checks are not popular). 
  These two cases proxy for all types of commercial disputes that enter the courts.  Two quite 
different cases are chosen in order to check whether the findings can be generalized to all civil litigation.  
The questions cover the step-by-step evolution of these cases before local courts in the country’s largest 
city.  Importantly, the survey studies both the structure of the judicial system – that is, where the plaintiff 
would seek redress in specific cases – and the efficiency with which judicial decisions are made. 
  The survey chooses cases in which the facts are undisputed by the parties but where the defendant 
still does not want to pay.  The judge consistently rules in favor of the plaintiff.  In this way the survey 
controls for fairness across countries, as judges follow the letter of the law.  We assume that no 
postjudgment motions can be filed.  Should any opposition to the complaint arise, the judge always decides 
in favor of the plaintiff.  The data consist of the number of steps required in the judicial process, the time it 
takes to accomplish each step, and the cost to the plaintiff.  The last provides a comparable measure of 
access to the judicial system, while all three address the issue of judicial efficiency.  The questionnaire 
makes a distinction between what is required by law and what happens in practice. 
  The following are examples of questions asked: What is the most commonly used mechanism for 
collecting overdue debt in your country?  Does this mechanism differ if the debt amount is small, equal to 5 
percent of GNP per capita, or large, equal to 50 percent of GNP per capita?  What type of court will this 
mechanism be applied through?  Would the judgment in the debt collection case be an oral representation 
of the general conclusions, an oral argument on specific facts and applicable laws, or a written argument on 
specific facts and applicable laws? 
 
Source: Lex Mundi, Harvard University, and World Bank.  World Development Report 2002 background 
project. 
 
ANNEX 3:   Procedural Complexity 
Procedural complexity is approximated by an index of dispute resolution, which describes substantive and 
procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts. The index covers seven 
broad categories of such regulation, as defined below: (1) the use of professional judges and lawyers as 
opposed to lay judges and self-representation, (2) the need to make written as opposed to oral arguments at 
various stages of the process, (3) the necessity of legal justification of various actions by either disputants 
or judges, (4) the regulation of evidence, (5) the nature of superior review of  
the first-instance judgment, (6) the presence of various statutory interventions during dispute resolution 
(such as service of process by a judicial officer), and (7) the count of the number of independent procedural 
actions required by law.
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Table 2: Elements of Procedural Complexity 
 
Professionals vs. laymen 
Describes whether the resolution of the case provided would rely mostly in the intervention of 
professional judges and attorneys, as opposed to the intervention of other types of adjudicators and lay 
people. This index ranks from 0 to 1, where 1 is the normalized sum of the following variables: (i) 
General jurisdiction court, (ii) Professional vs. non-professional (iii) Legal representation is 
mandatory. 
Written vs. oral index  
An index evaluating the written or oral nature of the actions involved in the procedure, from the filing 
of the complaint, until the actual enforcement, assigning a percentage of stages carried out mostly in a 
written form, as defined above, over the total number of applicable stages. 
Index of legal justification 
Describes the level of legal justification required in the process. This index ranks from 0 to 1, where 1 
means a higher use of legal language or justification, while 0 means a lower use. The index is formed 
by the normalized sum of the following variables (i) Complaint must be legally justified, (ii) 
Judgment must be legally justified, and (iii) Judgment must be on law, not on equity. 
Index: Statutory regulation of evidence 
Describes the level of statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation 
and recording of evidence. This index ranks from 0 to 1, where 1 means a higher statutory control or 
intervention, and 0 means a lower level of statutory intervention. The index is formed by the
normalized sum of the following variables: (i) Judge cannot introduce evidence, (ii) Judge cannot 
reject irrelevant evidence, (iii) Out-of-court statements are inadmissible, (iv) Mandatory pre-
qualification of questions, (v) Oral interrogation only by judge, (vi) Only original documents and 
certified copies are admissible, (vii) Authenticity and weight of evidence defined by law, and (viii) 
Mandatory recording of evidence. 
Index: Control of superior review 
Describes the level of control or intervention of the appellate court’s review of the first-instance 
judgment. This index ranks from 0 to 1, where 1 means a higher control or intervention, and 0 means 
a lower level of intervention. The index is formed by the normalized sum of the following variables: 
(i) Enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until resolution of appeal, (ii) Comprehensive 
review in appeal, and (iii) Interlocutory appeals are allowed. 
Index of other statutory interventions 
An index aggregating statutory interventions in judicial procedural actions. This index ranks from 0 to 
1, where 1 means a higher statutory control or intervention in the judicial process, and 0 means a 
lower level of statutory intervention. The index is formed by the normalized sum of the following 
variables: (i) Mandatory pre-trial conciliation, (ii) Service of process by judicial officer required, and 
(iii) Notification of judgment by judicial officer required. 
Independent procedural action index 
Independent procedural action index: Is coded as 1 if the total minimum number of independent 
procedural actions (defined as every action by the judge, the parties or a third person, required to 
complete the following stages of the process under the case facts provided: filing, admission, 
attachment, and service) would be higher or equal to the median, and 0 otherwise. 
Overall Procedural Complexity 
This index describes substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level 
civil trial courts, and is formed by adding up the following indices: (i) Professionals vs. laymen index, 
(ii) Written vs. oral index, (iii) Legal justification index, (iv) Statutory regulation of evidence index, 
(v) Superior review/control index, (vi) Other statutory interventions index, and (vii) Independent 
procedural actions >= median. The index ranks from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or 
intervention, and 0 means a lower level of statutory intervention.   40
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